Conference Announcement - Art and Psyche Conference - NYC July 19-22

There is still time to register to attend the Art and Psyche Conference!

Art and Psyche is an international conference organized by the Art and Psyche Working Group Sponsored by the Jungian Psychoanalytic Association, The International Association of Analytical Psychology and the Archive for Research in Archetypal Symbolism. Also cosponsored and hosted by New York University Steinhardt School of Culture, Education, and Human Development: Department of Applied Psychology and Department of Art and Art Professions.

The conference focuses on the creative collaboration between depth psychology and the arts. Traditional lectures, presentations, workshops, experiential activities, and breakouts will feature presentations by painters, musicians, poets, actors, photographers, psychotherapists, analysts and expressive arts therapists. Ten minute sparks of images and ideas will flash throughout the conference.

The opening day of the conference will offer designed tours of the National Museum of the American Indian in New York City, the Rubin Museum of Art, the Morgan Library and Museum, the Asia Society Museum, the Whitney Museum of American Art, the Metropolitan Museum of Art and its Watson Library, the Cathedral of St. John the Divine. There will be walking tours of the Masonic temple and the High Line, viewings of subway station murals in The Arts For Transit program, and selected art and psyche videos at NYU. Maps of galleries and subway art will be provided.

The Archive for Research in Archetypal Symbolism (ARAS) and the Kristine Mann Library (KML) will offer open houses for those interested in the arts, symbolism and psychology.

The Thursday night public program with the award-winning poet Mark Doty on Walt Whitman, and Donald Sosin on his score for the film Manhatta, will includea panel with composer Jorge Martin and photographer Deborah O’Grady. A Saturday night Dream-Over, an overnight spent at the Rubin Museum, will be offered.

73 presenters are scheduled over the 4 days of the conference, including Fisher King author Mark Winborn who will be offering a multi-media presentation based on his book Deep Blues: Human Soundscapes for the Archetypal Journey which explores the psychological foundations of the blues music genre.

Complete program information, registration and hotel information can be obtained at the Art and Psyche website.

Andrew Samuels: Post-Jungian Schools of Analytical Psychology

"To find one's way around in the contemporary Jungian world is not easy. Jung's standing as a psychological thinker and analyst, rather than guru or prophet, is reinforced by analytical psychologists and the writings of the post-Jungians. It no longer rests solely upon Jung's legacy of the twenty volumes of the Collected Works and his commensurate charisma. In a way, Jung needs the post-Jungians as much as they need him if his work is to be extended into the future. The prospect for analytical psychology is a shared concern and the inheritance has become a many-stranded skein of thought which has inspired, influenced, challenged, and in some instances infuriated, those who followed.

We should note the extent to which post-Jungians have felt able to challenge or attack Jung's work, often arguing with him on the basis of stringent criticisms from non-Jungians as well as adapting and integrating parallel developments in other approaches to psychology.

In his book Jungian Psychotherapy: a Study in Analytical Psychology, Fordham states that ‘a very little has been written on the development of the various schools of analytical psychology that have grown up’(Fordham, 1978, p. 53). I decided to respond to this, bearing in mind Fordham's assertion (p. ix) that ‘analytical psychology is a discipline in its own right… its ideas and practices can be assessed without regard to the persons who initiated them’.

Unlike the Freudians, post-Jungians have not formed into officially recognised schools, though the process has certainly taken place informally and there are groups in existence with common views. Dogmatism and conflict between groups has not been avoided.

To talk of Jungians, of post-Jungians and of schools of Jungians, is in itself a contentious matter. Jung stated that there simply was one Jungian—himself. He said he had no ambition to start a school of psychology. I imagine he had in mind an attempt to avoid what he considered Freud's excesses of rabbinical authority and the whole painful early history of psychoanalysis which involved so much personalia. Furthermore, as the ideologue of individuation with its stress on each person becoming himself and differentiating from others, not to mention his observation that a person's psychological type and personality play a part in dictating what he believes, Jung was bound to want to leave it up to the personal capacity of an individual as to how ‘Jungian’ he would be. However, as Henderson points out, ‘there is now a basic Jungian body of knowledge which does not permit unlimited experimentation or theorising’. And he goes on to say that Jung ‘abhorred systematisation of any kind and this was a reason why his school took so long to be formed (Henderson, 1975, pp. 120-121)....." (pp. 345-346)
　

"In formulating my own classification I have wanted above all to provide a model that will allow for individual differences while describing post-Jungian schools with sufficient coherence to be of use in the twin aims summarised by Goldenberg—to provide access into post-Jungian developments for outsiders and to enable a higher degree of structuring, ordering and mutual reflection in internal debate.

My hypothesis is that there are indeed three main schools. We can call these the Classical School, the Developmental School and the Archetypal School. My method is to select three aspects of theoretical discussion and three of clinical practice to which all analytical psychologists relate and I hope to demonstrate that it is the ordering and weighting of these that underpin the evolution of the schools.

The three theoretical areas are: (1) the definition of archetypal; (2) the concept of self; (3) the development of personality.

The three clinical aspects are: (1) the analysis of transference-countertransference; (2) emphasis upon symbolic experience of the self; (3) examination of highly differentiated imagery.

With regard to theory, I think the Classical School would weight the possibilities in the order 2, 1, 3. That is, the integrating and individuating self would be most important, other archetypal imagery arid potentials would come close behind and the early experience of the individual would be seen as of somewhat lesser importance. (I imagine this to represent, in the most general terms, Jung's own ordering of priorities, hence the use of the word ‘Classical’). The Developmental School would weight these possibilities in the order 3, 2, 1. Importance would be given to the personal development of the individual, which would then involve a consideration of the self, then seen as generating its archetypal potentialities and imagery over a lifetime. The Archetypal school would consider archetypal imagery first, the self second and development would receive less emphasis. Thus the ordering would be 1, 2, 3.

Turning to clinical practice, the Classical School would weight the possibilities 2, 3, 1, or perhaps 2, 1, 3. I am not sure whether transference-countertransference or a pursuit of particularised imagery would come second to the search for the self. The Developmental School would order its clinical priorities 1, 2, 3, or possibly 1,3,2. Here again, I am sure that transference-countertransference would be considered a most important aspect, but I am not certain whether experiences of the self or an examination of imagery would rate second position. The Archetypal School would probably function in the order 3, 2, 1. That is, particularised imagery would be regarded as more useful than symbolic experiences on the self, and both would be more central than transference-countertransference." (pp. 351-352)

Andrew Samuels (1983). The Emergence of Schools of Post-Jungian Analytical Psychology. Journal of Analytical Psychology, Vol. 28, pp. 345-362

Britton & Steiner - Interpretion: Selected Fact or Overvalued Idea?

"We have tried to illustrate the formation of interpretation from the selected fact and the difficulty of differentiating this from an overvalued idea. Before we consider this distinction further it is necessary to describe briefly Bion's notions on interpretation and how they are dependent on his theory of preconceptions, of the container/contained, and of the cyclical movement from the paranoid-schizoid to depressive positions (PS D).

In a situation where meaning is not apparent and facts are accumulating, the relationship of one psychic particle to another is not determined until the analyst's attention is taken by something which thus becomes the selected fact, and there emerges a configuration as the other psychic particles cohere by virtue of their relationship to it.

This configuration of elements in relation to a selected fact is highly specific to a particular patient at a particular moment in his analysis. It provides the substance (the contained) for an abstract form (the container) which already existed in the mind of the analyst, of which this newly emergent configuration becomes the incarnation. This previously empty form or 'state of expectation' (Bion, 1962, was awaiting an exemplary situation to give it life. The 'empty form' was the background theory in the analyst's mind that found expression in this new formulation. These theories or expectant containers accumulate in the mind of the analyst and are derived from his general analytic theories, his own subjectively-based theories about people, his clinical experience of other patients, and his accumulating experience of this particular patient. 'Conception is that which results when a pre-conception mates with the appropriate sense impressions.' In this context it should be the analyst's mind primed with its theories which awaits as a receptacle for its expectations to be fulfilled by experience of the patient. This requires a capacity to wait, and if the analyst is unable to tolerate the uncertainty of not understanding he may turn to his theory as a source of reassurance and look for a patient to act as a container for the theory. Bion emphasises that the analyst's pre-conception has to act as a container for the realisation, and 'NOT' the other way round (Bion, 1962).

Bion's notion is that we move from a fragmentary psychic state (PS) to a coherent psychic state (D), and at each encounter with new experience we traverse this route. In analysis, therefore, both patient and analyst have to face periods of disintegration as new experiences are confronted before they are assimilated and understood. The initial disintegration represents a move towards PS, and this has to be contained before a true integration towards D can result. We think this is only possible where there is a sense of containment already in existence which provides a limit to the sense of fragmentation and incomprehension, so that it is not boundless, nullifying all meaning. Otherwise the experience is of 'nothingness', terrifying 'bottomlessness', or complete 'incoherence'. For many patients, for at least a good deal of the time, the analyst's presence and the setting provide this outer container. When this is not the case the situation is very fraught and often dramatic. Meaning is then sought, not to make sense, but to provide an alternative to the missing container.

We suggest that this is one reason why ideas become overvalued by either patient or analyst. They are used to buttress the fragile sense of stability in psychic space and are therefore required to have the qualities of permanence and substance. In such circumstances, interpretation may become a means of seeking security rather than of inquiry, and its constancy more highly valued than its truth. In this scheme of things there is no waiting for the evolution of the selected fact. The overvalued idea becomes the 'pre-selected fact', which is not emergent but mandatory in every psychic situation, compelling other psychic particles to orient themselves around it as if it were permanently the selected fact....

Two situations would seem likely to give rise to the intrusion of an overvalued idea into the analytic field, thus obscuring or preventing the natural evolution of the session: (1) the patient with an intolerance of uncertainty or doubt, who does not feel adequately contained in the analytic situation, presents material or interprets the analyst's behaviour in conformity with an overvalued idea, thus constricting the analysis within the confines of his existing mainly unconscious beliefs; (2) the analyst who relieves his fear of losing his analytic identity in a situation of uncertainty or confusion by attaching himself to an overvalued idea, for which he seeks confirmation in the patient for the beliefs which, unconsciously, he thinks are necessary for his psychic equilibrium.

In the first of these instances, the analyst's task is to discover the undisclosed defining hypothesis of the patient, i.e. the patient's overvalued idea, which may be unconscious. In the second, his task is to recognise his own overdetermined use of an idea and to try to understand his own behaviour. This may be unfinished business in his own analysis or it may be a specific countertransference to his patient, in which case the unravelling of this is part of the patient's analysis and may reveal a re-enactment of an unconscious object relation in the transference." (pp. 1076-1077)

Ronald Britton and John Steiner (1994). Interpretation: Selected Fact or Overvalued Idea?. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, Vol. 75, pp. 1069-1078

Christopher Bollas - The Generative Erotic Transfer

"In the generative erotic transference, the analysand is acutely aware of the analyst's body self. Indeed, part of the analysand's agony is the precise erotic interest in that body. Although this relation can and frequently does become a resistance to analysis, in that the patient refuses to freely associate, it may lead to an important presentation of the analysand's instinctual life achieved through transference embodiment, in which the patient erotically cathects the analyst's presence. What is meant by transference embodiment? To love the object is to release one's instinctual capability, which, in turn, gives the body self a new-found authority that I term embodiment.3 The transference relationship quite naturally evokes latent instinctual capacities in the analysand, and, if all goes well, he or she comes into a new-found body-experiencing in the analyst's presence. Although the analysand will suffer a transitional disappointment because the analyst will not agree to the analysand's erotic wishes, the analysand feels instinctually emboldened and proud of his or her ability to represent sexual life in the sessions. It is a relief to find a body that is not merely an internal object, but also a body to love.

In some respects, the localised pathology of the erotic transfer becomes a motive for speech, as the patient partly wishes to engage the analyst through the conviction supplied by erotic passion. And yet it is difficult to cross the boundary between inner relations and external realities. In moments when speaking the internal erotic to the actual object of desire, the patient simultaneously recognises the integrity of the boundary between the internal and the actual. This may allow for a maximum nonerotic representation of the body's relation to the other, because the analysand either explicitly or implicitly indicates that she knows that her erotic is to an internal object that needs its reporting to come to full elaboration. In so doing she will know, however, that any person's narration of the actual other is precarious, and there may be innumerable reasons why the patient does not feel secure representing the analyst's body." (pp. 574-575)

3 "Embodiment" refers to the individual's pleasure in having or being a body. Transference embodiment is the development of pleasure in one's own body, driven initially by the erotic transference, but ending in a sense of the intrinsic pleasures of bodily existing, as opposed to the world of abstract thought and schizoid inner object relating.

Christopher Bollas (1994). Aspects of the Erotic Transference. Psychoanalytic Inquiry, Vol. 14, pp. 572-590

Rushi Ledermann - Healthy Aspects of Regression

"Jung, on the whole, takes a favourable view of regression and points out its teleological value. In ‘The theory of psychoanalysis’ (Jung 7) he says: ‘the neurotic's retreat to the infantile level does not mean only regression and stagnation’ (here is the synonymous use of the two concepts which I mentioned earlier) ‘but also the possibility of discovering a new life plan. Regression is thus in very truth the basic condition for the act of creation.’

In my view healthy regression takes place to a greater or lesser degree in the analysis of all patients with neurotic symptoms such as phobias, obsessions, neurotic depression, etc. A different kind of depression, usually called schizoid depression, will be mentioned when I discuss stagnation. Regression may occur spontaneously in a patient or may result from analytic work.

Regression may occur, and be therapeutically desirable, in patients who have missed out in certain areas of their development, such as adolescence or unresolved sibling rivalry, or who could not play as children. Regression may also take place if certain psychic functions, such as feeling or thinking, have remained underdeveloped. Jung in his essay ‘On psychic energy’ (Jung 9) mentions the complementary function of regression. He says: ‘unconscious material activated by regression will contain the … missing function, although still in embryonic form, archaic and undeveloped’.

Equally, regression may occur when a traumatic event, like the death of someone close, could not be worked through at the time it occurred. These gaps in a person's development seem to me to be caused frequently by a defect in the deintegrative/reintegrative processes, which occurred at some time in the past. This defect, if not repaired, may seriously impede the process of individuation. Hence the need to regress to the damaged area of the personality.

As Jung has shown, neurotic symptoms are frequently attempts, albeit unsuccessful ones, to solve neurotic conflicts. They are a way in which the psyche spontaneously tries to repair damage which it has suffered. Thus, if understood correctly, they can serve as signposts for the analyst, indicating to which area the patient needs to regress so that analytic repair can be effected. In our present terminology we could say they indicate where deintegrative/reintegrative processes were impeded. This may have been caused by an innate deficiency in the patient or, more often than not, by an environment which was inimical to successful deintegration. It occurs when the patient could not enjoy a state of healthy dependence on his parents at a time in his childhood when such dependence was an indispensable condition for healthy development.

In analysis, regression can last for minutes, for days, for months, or in severe cases for years. If a patient regresses to the pre-verbal period of his life, he will sometimes express his regression in the consulting room by behaving like a baby who has no words to communicate. This may go on for a prolonged period of time. His regressed behaviour may involve screaming, kicking the wall, punching or throwing cushions, hiding under the rug or behind a chair, or simply lying in the position of a baby, with arms raised, or going to sleep in sessions. However, in my experience, this deep regression to infantile behaviour occurs more often than not in patients who have come out of long periods of what I call stagnation. I shall revert to this point in more detail when I discuss stagnation.

The analytic environment with its consistency of place, regularly agreed session times, its couch with cushions and rug, and, last but not least, an analyst who is reliably there for the patient in a consistent and caring way, all create a situation which is inducive to regression, unless, as I shall explain later, the patient is in a state of stagnation.

The analytic setting evokes memories of infancy in the patient, who may relive with the analyst a state of dependence which is not unlike that of a very young child or baby depending on his mother, albeit in analysis it occurs in an entirely non-physical way on a symbolic mother and is helped along by transference interpretations which frequently make the patient conscious of his child feelings.

In my view the need to regress springs up spontaneously out of the patient's psyche. Hence an analyst cannot cause a patient to regress, nor can he necessarily stop a patient from regressing if he wishes to do so. If a patient has regressed to the archetypal layer of his psyche and the analyst fears that a psychosis might develop if the patient stays regressed, all he can do is to cease making further interpretations and try to help the patient to address his problems in the here and now. The analyst may also consider reducing the frequency of sessions. In such a case the analyst must pay special attention to his countertransference: whether or not he has become fascinated by the archetypal material, has unwittingly communicated this to the patient, and has thus contributed to his getting stuck on the archetypal level. However, regression usually occurs when it is necessary for healing and for further growth. As Jung has pointed out, the psyche, like the body, has an innate tendency to heal injury." (pp. 484-486)
　

Rushi Ledermann (1991). Regression and Stagnation. Journal of Analytical Psychology, Vol. 36, pp. 483-504